Un père biologique face à l’adoption de sa fille (suite)

Magistrat de la Haute Cour de justice d’Angleterre et du pays de Galles, le juge Alistair MacDonald a rendu aujourd’hui une décision intéressante dans une affaire où un père biologique a tenté de s’opposer au placement puis à l’adoption de sa fille. Une première décision rendue en novembre dernier avait déjà fait l’objet ici d’une chronique dont nous reprenons l’essentiel ci-après. Nonobstant les particularités du régime de common law en vigueur outre-Manche, cette nouvelle chronique pourrait intéresser certains de nos lecteurs.

Contexte

En l’espèce, une petite fille avait fait l’objet d’une procédure de placement en 2015. Le nom du père n’avait pas été indiqué sur l’acte de naissance de l’enfant, mais un test de paternité réalisé en novembre 2015 avait permis à un homme de se faire reconnaître comme étant le père biologique et d’être partie à la procédure. Après que l’ordonnance finale de placement eût été rendue en avril 2016, le père avait sollicité l’autorisation d’en interjeter appel [1], mais cela lui avait été refusé au mois de juillet suivant.

L’enfant avait ensuite été placée pour adoption et une demande d’ordonnance d’adoption avait été présentée par des adoptants potentiels. Le père avait de nouveau sollicité l’autorisation d’interjeter appel de l’ordonnance, mais cette nouvelle demande avait également été rejetée en février 2017 et une décision d’adoption avait été rendue en avril 2017. Le père avait encore tenté en juin 2019 d’interjeter appel du refus d’autorisation de s’opposer à la décision d’adoption mais, sa requête étant trop tardive, il avait de nouveau essuyé un refus le mois suivant.

Usant d’un ultime stratagème, le père avait ensuite demandé en mars 2020 une déclaration de filiation à l’égard de l’enfant afin que l’acte de naissance original fût modifié pour établir sa qualité de père biologique. Petit détail qui aura son importance par la suite : sa requête ne précisait pas que l’enfant avait été adoptée en 2017… Quoi qu’il en soit, c’est à cette demande que le juge Alistair MacDonald avait dû répondre en novembre 2020.

Les problèmes a résoudre

Il lui avait fallu pour cela résoudre trois problèmes :

« 1. Does the court have jurisdiction pursuant to s 55A(1) of the Family Law Act 1986 to grant to a birth parent in the position of the applicant a declaration of parentage in respect of a child following the lawful adoption of that child under the Part 1 of the Adoption and Children Act 2002? If the court does have jurisdiction to grant a declaration of parentage in such circumstances, does s 55A(5) of the Family Law Act 1986 permit the question of whether the court should refuse to hear such an application, on the grounds that it is not in the child’s best interests to determine the application, to be dealt with as a preliminary issue? If so, should the court refuse at this stage to hear the application in this case or list the matter for a final hearing? »

Les dispositions législatives pertinentes

Le juge Alistair MacDonald avait d’abord détaillé les dispositions législatives pertinentes : celles du Family Law Act 1986 relatives aux déclarations de filiation, celles de l’Adoption and Children Act 2002 relatives aux conséquences d’une décision d’adoption pour l’enfant et ses parents biologiques, ainsi que les dispositions idoines des Family Procedure Rules 2010.

Discussion

Le juge Alistair MacDonald s’était ensuite déclaré convaincu que le tribunal était compétent, conformément à la section 55A(1) du Family Law Act 1986 et en l’espèce, pour accorder à un parent biologique une déclaration de filiation à l’égard d’un enfant subséquemment à l’adoption légale d’icelui :

« 50. Within the foregoing context I am satisfied that it is possible to read the words “any person” in s 55A(1) of the Family Law Act 1986 as encompassing a birth parent in the position of [the father] whose child has been made the subject of an adoption order pursuant to s 46 of the Adoption and Children Act 2002 without the risk of conflicting decisions being arrived at due to the terms of s 67 of the 2002 Act. Within the context of these two statutory frameworks, it remains possible for a birth parent to establish the truth of the proposition contended for, namely that he or she is as a matter of fact the parent of the adopted child, without that factual determination coming into conflict with the status in law of the child and the adoptive parents under s 67 of the Adoption and Children Act 2002. Within this context, a declaration as to status under s 55A(1) of the 1986 Act does not conflict with the question of legal status established by the operation of s 67(1) of the 2002 Act. This conclusion is, of course, entirely separate from the question of whether such a declaration should be made following the adoption of a child. »

Le juge Alistair MacDonald s’était également déclaré convaincu que la section 55A(5) du Family Law Act 1986 permettait, en l’espèce, qu’il fût procédé à une enquête préliminaire afin de savoir s’il était dans l’intérêt supérieur de l’enfant que le tribunal refusât d’entendre une demande en vertu de la section 55A(1) du Family Law Act 1986.

Le troisième problème à résoudre, le plus ardu mais aussi le plus intéressant, était celui de savoir si, au regard de l’intérêt supérieur de l’enfant, le tribunal devait refuser d’entendre la demande du père ou renvoyer l’affaire à une audience ultérieure. Il fallait pour cela trouver le juste équilibre entre plusieurs facteurs.

D’une part, les parents adoptifs avaient fait savoir qu’ils ne s’opposaient pas à ce que le nom du père biologique soit inscrit sur l’acte de naissance de l’enfant car ils estimaient important qu’icelle connaisse l’histoire complète de sa vie ; toutes les informations officielles la concernant devaient donc être correctes et sans lacunes. Ils craignaient cependant d’éventuelles difficultés si la demande du père biologique était acceptée, icelui ayant clairement exprimé son souhait de jouer un rôle dans la vie de sa fille.

D’autre part, et c’est le point le plus intéressant, l’affaire révélait une lacune législative :

« 71. […] The potential disruption consequent an application by a birth parent for a declaration of parentage in respect of an adopted child is brought even further into focus by the fact that whilst, for the reasons set out above, I am satisfied that a birth parent is entitled to apply for a declaration of parentage under s 55A(1) of the 1986 Act, neither the statute nor the associated rules of procedure in the FPR contain the protective provisions that are ordinarily incorporated where an application can be made by a birth parent with respect to a child who has been made the subject of an adoption order and which account for the fact that the child has been adopted. Section 55A of the 1986 [Act] does not provide a permission stage before an application can be issued in respect of an adopted child, by contrast, for example, to that imposed by Parliament by s 51A(4)(c) of the Adoption and Children Act 2002 upon birth parents who seek an order under s 51A of the 2002 Act. Further, the effect of the rules in Part 8 of the FPR is that the adoptive parents will be amongst the automatic respondents to the application for a declaration of parentage in respect of a child who has been made the subject of an adoption order (notwithstanding the difficulties with the adoptive parents being served with the application in a closed serial number adoption case). In addition, if a declaration of parentage is made in favour of a birth parent with respect of a child who has been made the subject of an adoption order under the Adoption and Children Act 2002, pursuant to […] FPR r 8.22(1) the declaration in favour of the birth parent made by the court must state the name given to the child by the adoptive parents if different (in circumstances where, if the child is known by a name other than that which appears in that child’s birth certificate, r 8.22(1) requires that other name must also be stated in any order and declaration of parentage), which order would, by FPR r 8.22(2), have to be sent to the Registrar General within 21 days beginning with the date the declaration was made for the Registrar General to consider whether re-registration should take place under the provisions of the Births and Deaths Registration Act 1953. Within this latter context, the matters set out […] above regarding the consequences of re-registration also have the potential to cause disruption.

« 72. Had the adoptive parents not been given informal notice of [the father]’s application and their views in respect of the same ascertained as set out in the statement of [the adoption agency], the position set out in the two foregoing paragraphs would constitute a weighty factor in favour of refusing, in [the child]’s best interests, to deal with [the father]’s application at this stage. However, the adoptive parents are now aware of [the father]’s application and, moreover, have expressed qualified support for the aim that [the father] seeks to achieve by that application insofar as it relates to the amendment of [the child]’s birth certificate. In these circumstances, whilst certain of the matters set out above will fall for further careful consideration by the court when deciding whether to grant the declaration sought (in particular in the context of considering the issue of public policy pursuant to s 58(1) of the Family Law Act 1986), they are less powerful as reasons for refusing at this stage to hear the application where the application has already caused a degree of disruption to the equilibrium of the family which the adoptive parents have, to their credit, met with a degree of child centred equanimity. »

Décision du 18 novembre 2020

Convaincu qu’il n’était pas dans l’intérêt de l’enfant de refuser d’entendre la demande de son père biologique mais qu’il n’était pas non plus en mesure de statuer définitivement en l’état de la législation, le juge Alistair MacDonald avait donc renvoyé l’affaire à une audience ultérieure, le temps de solliciter le Family Procedure Rule Committee pour qu’il éclaircisse les règles énoncées dans la partie 8 des Family Procedure Rules 2010 :

« 78. […] The strict application of the current rules in this situation will result in [the child]’s adoptive name appeared on the declaration of parentage. Within this context, it will be important ahead of the final hearing of [the father]’s application to establish whether a declaration of parentage pursuant to s 55A(1) of the Family Law Act 1986 is only way of achieving this agreed aim. For example, by HM Passport Office Form GRO185 an application can be made to re-register a child’s birth to add the details of the natural father. Within this context, it is my intention to direct the adoption agency to make enquiries of the Registrar General to establish whether this procedure can be utilised to amend the birth certificate without the need for a declaration of parentage and whether, the Registrar General would also, as a matter of practice, add the word “Adopted” to upon re-registration following the use of this procedure where the child has been made the subject of an adoption order by the court.

« 79. […] If the procedure posited in the foregoing paragraph is not available, the following aspects of the rules will remain of particular relevance at the final hearing of [the father]’s application:

« i) By FPR r 8.22(1), were the court to make a declaration in favour of the applicant that declaration, that declaration must, pursuant to FPR r 8.22(1), contain [the child]’s adoptive name, which at present is confidential to the adoptive parents. It is not clear whether the court has power to disapply the provisions of FPR r 8.22(1).

« ii) FPR r 8.22(2) pursuant to r 8.22(2), a copy of the declaration would have to have to be sent to the Registrar General within 21 days beginning with the date the declaration was made for the Registrar General to consider whether re-registration should take place. It is not clear whether the Registrar General would accept an order in respect of which the court has disapplied FPR r 8.22(1) if it has the power to do so.

« 80. In the absence of a procedure for amending [the child]’s birth certificate that does not rely on a declaration of parentage, when the court considers the merits of [the father]’s substantive application, and in particular the application of the public policy provisions of s 58(1) of the Family Law Act 1986, the court will need to consider whether it has the power to disapply FPR r 8.22(1) to avoid [the child]’s adoptive name appearing on the declaration of parentage having regard to the need to maintain the confidentiality of the adoptive placement. Further, the court will also need to understand whether the Registrar General would accept a declaration in respect of which the court has disapplied FPR r 8.22(1), if it has the power to do so and whether, if the Registrar General exercised his discretion to re-register the birth following the granting of a declaration of parentage, the Registrar General would also, as a matter of practice, add the word “Adopted” to upon re-registration following a declaration of parentage in favour of a birth parent in circumstances where the child who is the subject of the declaration has been made the subject of an adoption order by the court. Within this context, I will make directions with a view to ensuring these issues are fully ventilated at the final hearing.

« 81. Finally, whilst in this case the adoptive parents have been put on informal notice of the application and their views ascertained, this case raises the wider issue of whether, in the absence of a permission stage in s 55A of the Family Law Act 1986, an amendment is required to FPR r 8.20(1) to legislate for the fact that applications under s 55A(1) of the 1986 Act can, as I have found, be made by birth parents. I also note that the Form 63 application for a declaration of parentage contains no provision for indicating the child whose parentage is in issue has been adopted. Whilst I note that the court retains control over who is respondent to any proceedings pursuant to Rule 1.4(2)(b) FPR 2010, in circumstances where, as matters, stand FPR r 8.20(1) means that adoptive parents are automatic respondents I consider it appropriate to refer these matters to the Family Procedure Rules Committee for their consideration. »

Décision du 13 juillet 2021

Une nouvelle audience a eu lieu le mois dernier, au cours de laquelle un représentant du gouvernement britannique est intervenu pour apporter les éclaircissements demandés par le juge Alistair MacDonald, lequel a rendu aujourd’hui sa décision définitive.

Le juge Alistair MacDonald a d’abord passé en revue la législation applicable, notamment les dispositions de la section 58(1) du Family Law Act 1986 concernant les demandes de déclaration de filiation (§§ 22-25), celles des sections 57 à 65 de l’Adoption and Children Act 2002 qui a introduit un nouveau régime du contrôle des informations protégées, notamment les informations d’identification d’une personne adoptée (§§ 30-31), ainsi que la règle 14.24 des Family Procedure Rules 2010 concernant le contrôle de la confidentialité des dossiers d’adoption judiciaire (§ 32).

Il a également souligné l’impact d’une décision d’adoption au regard de la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme :

« 36. […] The fundamental nature of the change of legal status visited on the child and the adoptive parents by the making of an adoption order is further emphasised by the fact that an adoption order will act to terminate the birth parents’ Art 8 right to respect for private and family life with the child made the subject of the adoption order […]. »

Le juge Alistair MacDonald a ensuite examiné dans quelle mesure le tribunal peut écarter tout ou partie de la règle 8.22 des Family Procedure Rules 2010, en s’appuyant notamment sur la jurisprudence Re F (Paternity:Registration) [2011] EWCA Civ 1765, [2013] 2 FLR 1036 (§§ 49-56), et a ainsi conclu :

« 57. In any event however, if discretion to disapply r 8.22(1) exists, the Court of Appeal made clear in Re F (Paternity: Registration) that such a discretion must only be utilised in exceptional circumstances and with an eye to the statutory context in which recourse is being had to the powers conferred by the procedural rules. »

Le juge Alistair MacDonald a ensuite estimé que cette conclusion ne pouvait s’appliquer en l’espèce :

« 64. Whilst unusual, in circumstances where I have found that the court has jurisdiction under s.55A of the Family Law Act 1986 to grant to a birth parent a declaration of parentage in respect of a child following the lawful adoption of that child under the Part 1 of the Adoption and Children Act 2002, it cannot be said in my judgment that the application made by [the father, and the situation it gives rise to, is exceptional in nature, permitted as it is by the statutory scheme and open, in principle, to any birth parent seeking a declaration of parentage. »

Ayant examiné toutes les dispositions légales applicables et la jurisprudence pertinente, le juge Alistair MacDonald a conclu qu’il serait manifestement contraire à l’ordre public d’accorder au père une déclaration de filiation à l’égard de sa fille postérieurement à l’adoption d’icelle (§ 68).

Il a également exposé des éléments qui lui paraissent essentiels en matière d’adoption :

« 69. As I have articulated in the course of this judgment, it is a firmly established element of public policy recognised by the law that the integrity of the adoption process is dependent on certain matters remaining confidential, in particular matters relating to the identity of adoptive parents, the adoptive name of the child and the location of the adoptive placement. It is likewise a firmly established aspect of public policy that the result of an adoption order should be that an adopted child ceases to be the child of his previous parent and becomes, for all purposes, the child of the adopters, that change of status being final and permanent and the family unit thereby created being inviolable. Finally, it is equally well established that an adopted person is entitled to determine whether they wish to have information about their birth relatives or not and, if they choose to seek that information, should be provided with it after they have been offered counselling and intermediary support services. »

Il convient enfin de relever cette note d’humanité – qui fait si cruellement défaut dans les décisions judiciaires françaises – adressée au père :

« 77. I know that the decision of the court will come as a great disappointment to [the father]. However, as at the beginning of my first judgment in this matter, it is important at the end of this judgment once again to make clear that, notwithstanding [the father]’s continuing view that this application prefigured his resuming a role in [his daughter]’s life, even were the court to have decided to make the declaration of parentage he sought, that declaration would not of itself meant that [the father] could recommence involvement in [his daughter]’s life and would not have conferred upon [the father] parental responsibility in respect of [his daughter] nor any other legal rights in respect her. Further, it is clear from their statements through the adoption agency that the court can have confidence, and that [the father] can have confidence, that the adoptive parents will, in any event, ensure that [his daughter] is aware of her origins as she grows up. »

Références

England and Wales High Court (Family Division)
Date : 13 juillet 2021
Décision : H v An Adoption Agency (No.2) (Declaration of Parentage and Public Policy) [2021] EWHC 1943 (Fam)

Note

1. La législation du Royaume-Uni (cf. section VIII des Civil Procedure Rules 1998 et sections 54 à 58 de l’Access to Justice Act 1999) prévoit une autorisation préalable pour pouvoir faire appel d’une décision judiciaire.

Jugement du 18 novembre 2020 archivé au format PDF (478 Ko, 27 p.).

Jugement du 13 juillet 2021 archivé au format PDF (291 Ko, 27 p.).

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