La Cour européenne des droits de l’homme condamne un vol d’enfant en Russie

Cour européenne des droits de l’homme

La Cour européenne des droits de l’homme a condamné aujourd’hui la Russie au titre de l’article 8 de la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme protégeant le droit au respect de la vie privée et familiale. Les juridictions russes avaient refusé de reconnaître la paternité du requérant et validé l’adoption d’un de ses enfants. La Cour européenne des droits de l’homme a estimé que les juridictions concernées n’avaient pas pris la peine de vérifier si l’enfant avait des parents auprès desquels elle pouvait vivre. Des cas similaires ont été signalés en France, où l’Aide sociale à l’enfance ne s’intéresse pas souvent aux pères des enfants qui lui sont confiés…

En l’espèce, le requérant, Sergey Stanislavovich Uzbyakov, est un ressortissant russe originaire d’Ouzbékistan, où il naquit en 1976, et résidant à Kurganovka (§ 1). Il est le père de cinq enfants, dont la dernière est née à la fin de novembre 2009 (§ 5). Séjournant d’abord de manière illégale en Russie, son nom ne fut malheureusement pas mentionné sur les certificats de naissance des enfants (§ 6). Arrêté en janvier 2011, Sergey demeura en détention provisoire jusqu’au mois d’avril suivant (§§ 7-8). La mère des enfants, avec laquelle il vivait en couple, décéda pendant cette période d’incarcération, en février, et les enfants furent placés le mois suivant : les quatre aînés furent envoyés dans un pensionnat pour orphelins et la benjamine, alors âgée de quatorze mois, fut confiée à une maison d’enfants (§ 9).

Informé du décès de sa compagne et du placement de leurs enfants, Sergey engagea aussitôt les démarches nécessaires pour faire reconnaître sa paternité (§ 10). Pendant ce même mois de mars 2011, la benjamine fut confiée à des parents adoptifs potentiels qui l’emmenèrent chez eux, à Morchansk (§§ 11-13). Les autres enfants furent recueillis par leur tante maternelle en mai (§ 14).

Le tribunal de district de Morchansk autorisa en septembre 2011 le couple auquel avait été confié la benjamine à l’adopter, considérant que sa mère était décédée, que le nom de son père ne figurait pas sur son certificat de naissance, qu’elle s’était retrouvée privée de soins parentaux et qu’elle avait séjourné dans une maison d’enfants. Le tribunal avait également été informé que les autres membres de la fratrie avaient été confiés à une famille d’accueil (§§ 15-19).

À l’issue de la procédure en reconnaissance de paternité que Sergey avait engagée alors qu’il était encore en détention, le tribunal municipal de Kamenka déclara en avril 2012 qu’il était bien le père des quatre aînés et ordonna qu’ils lui fussent restitués (§§ 20-26). Cependant, à l’occasion de la procédure distincte qu’il avait engagée concernant sa benjamine, il apprit qu’elle avait été adoptée (§ 27). Il compléta alors sa demande de reconnaissance de paternité par une demande d’annulation de l’ordonnance d’adoption, arguant notamment que l’adoption avait été autorisée en violation de la législation, qu’elle était contraire aux intérêts de l’enfant, que la législation interdit la séparation des fratries et qu’elle impose que les parents donnent leur consentement (§§ 28-34). Il est à noter que son action bénéficia de l’appui de l’autorité des gardes et des tutelles du district de Kamensky ainsi que de celui d’un représentant du commissaire des droits de l’homme de la Fédération de Russie (§ 35).

Tout en reconnaissant la paternité de Sergey, le tribunal municipal de Kamenka rejeta cependant sa demande en octobre 2012, considérant que la loi n’offrait pas de motifs de révoquer l’ordonnance d’adoption et que, par ailleurs, les parents adoptifs avaient satisfait à leurs obligations légales et réunissaient toutes les conditions pour bien élever l’enfant, bénéficiant de conditions de vie adéquates, d’emplois stables et d’une situation financière solide (§§ 36-43).

Tous les appels formés par Sergey furent rejetés (§§ 44-47) et la Cour suprême de la Fédération de Russie prononça la décision définitive en juin 2013 (§ 48). Sergey introduisit alors une requête devant la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme en octobre 2013, alléguant que l’adoption de sa fille avait été actée sans qu’il en fût informé et que le refus par la justice de reconnaître sa paternité et d’annuler l’ordonnance d’adoption constituaient une violation du droit au respect de la vie privée et familiale protégé par l’article 8 de la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme (§ 67).

Dans sa décision (rédigée en anglais) rendue publique aujourd’hui, la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme a d’abord constaté que Sergey a été un conjoint et un père irréprochable :

« 80. In the present case, the applicant cohabited with [the mother] for an uninterrupted period from 1994 until her death on 4 February 2011, that is for approximately seventeen years. Five children, including [his daughter], were born as a result of that relationship. It is not in dispute that the applicant is the biological father of all the children, including [his daughter]. It is also clear that the applicant, his partner and their children lived together, and that the applicant took care of and supported the children […]. In particular, he collected [the mother] and [their daughter] from the maternity hospital and was involved in [his daughter]’s upbringing for the first year of her life. The Court finds the Government’s argument regarding the applicant’s prolonged absences from the family unconvincing, as it was not corroborated by any documentary evidence; nor did the courts make any findings in that regard in the domestic proceedings.

« 81. The foregoing considerations are sufficient to enable the Court to conclude that from the moment of [his daughter]’s birth there was a bond between the applicant and his daughter which amounted to “family life” within the meaning of Article 8 of the Convention. There is no distinct question as regards the applicant’s “private life”; indeed, the applicant’s arguments under both heads are inseparable […].

« 82. It follows that Article 8 of the Convention is applicable. »

Examinant ensuite dans quelle mesure les juridictions russes avaient bien pris toutes les mesures adéquates et nécessaires que l’on pouvait raisonnablement attendre d’elles pour que la petite fille pût mener une vie familiale normale auprès de son père et des membres de sa fratrie, la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme a reconnu que la décision initiale de placer les enfants était évidemment nécessaire dans les circonstances de l’espèce, mais elle a estimé que les juridictions concernées n’avaient pas pris la peine de vérifier si des solutions viables autres que l’adoption étaient envisageables et si, en particulier, la fillette avait des parents auprès desquels elle aurait pu vivre :

« 114. […] The Court observes that in the adoption proceedings the childcare authority brought to the court’s attention the fact that [the child] had siblings who were being brought up in another foster family […]. It is thus clear that the domestic court was made aware of important factual elements of the situation that should have been taken into account. In particular, it could have obtained the relevant information regarding the applicant and his ties with [the child] from […] the sister of the applicant’s late partner, who was the guardian of the applicant’s four elder children […] at the time of the adoption proceedings; it could also have obtained such information from the children themselves.

« 115. Moreover, as early as March 2011, when he was still in pre-trial detention, the applicant started taking steps to have his paternity in respect of all his five children established in law and to take them all into his care […]. In particular, in March 2011 he lodged a claim in which he listed his five children’s names, patronymics, surnames and dates of births with the same court which eventually granted an adoption order in respect of [his daughter] in favour of the third parties […]. Although that claim was not compliant with certain formal requirements and was thus returned to the applicant […], it showed the applicant’s demonstrable interest in and commitment to his children, including [his daughter].

« 116. In the light of the foregoing, the Court considers that the domestic authorities had a realistic opportunity to establish that [the child] had a biological father and siblings; it could and should have considered the circumstances of [the child]s life with her natural family, and could and should have examined the third parties’ application to adopt [the child] in the light of those circumstances […]. However, the first-instance court took a very formalistic approach by limiting itself to mere reference to the child’s birth certificate, where the information about her father was missing, and noting that the prospective adopters satisfied the requirements of the relevant law. Whilst the Court is prepared to accept that such reasoning by the domestic court was “relevant”, it clearly cannot consider it “sufficient”, let alone convincingly demonstrating any exceptional circumstances for [the child]’s adoption by the third parties […].

« 117. The Court further observes that the first-instance court in the initial adoption proceedings took no steps to inform the applicant of the proceedings in question, let alone make sure that he was heard in those proceedings, despite the serious nature of that measure […].

« 118. Against this background, the Court considers that the domestic authorities showed a serious lack of diligence in relation to the adoption procedure. As a result of their inaction, the applicant was excluded from the relevant proceedings completely, and thus deprived of the requisite protection of his rights and interests. Furthermore, from a more substantive point of view, the authorities granted a full adoption without inquiring about the concrete circumstances of [the child]’s life with her natural family and basing their decision on an overly formalistic reasoning.

« 119. It is also relevant that [the child] was less than two years old when her adoption was ordered. The Court reiterates that in cases concerning family life, breaking off contact with a very young child may result in the progressive deterioration of the child’s relationship with his or her parent […]. Moreover, by ordering [the child]’s adoption by third parties, the domestic authorities separated [the child] from not only the applicant, her only surviving parent, but also her siblings […]. In such circumstances, the Court has strong doubts that [the child]’s adoption by third parties corresponded to her best interests.

[…]

« 122. […] The Court observes that, on the basis of the evidence in their possession, the national courts did not doubt the fact that the applicant and [the child] were biologically related. Furthermore, they never questioned the applicant’s ability to raise and educate his children. It was never alleged or established by the domestic courts that the family had ever attracted the attention of social or childcare authorities prior to [the mother]’s death, or that while living with their natural family the children had ever showed a lack of adequate developmental and educational progress, been neglected, or had their health or life put at risk. In fact, in a separate set of proceedings, the national authorities found no obstacles to the recognition of the applicant’s paternity in respect of his other four children and their return to his care […]. The only reason for their refusal to formally recognise the applicant’s paternity in respect of [his daughter] was, in essence, the fact that she had already been adopted by third parties by the time they considered that question, and there were no formal grounds under the relevant legal provision to revoke the adoption order. In particular, “a court’s establishment of the fact that a child was descended from a particular person” did not constitute grounds under that provision for revoking the adoption order, and no other grounds such as guilty conduct by the foster parents in respect of [the child] could be found […].

« 123. The Court reiterates that, in view of the great variety of family situations which are possible, the best interests of the child cannot be determined by a general legal assumption, and that a fair balancing of the rights of all individuals involved necessitates an examination of the particular circumstances of each case […]. In respect of Russia, the Court has previously held that an interference with applicants’ family life which was the result of the automatic application of inflexible legal provisions in that field amounted to a failure to respect their family life […].

« 124. The Court has found in paragraph 118 above that the adoption proceedings were deficient and revealed a serious lack of diligence on the part of the authorities. The authorities were therefore responsible for the situation whereby the applicant’s biological daughter was adopted by third parties, a situation which the applicant sought to resolve in the proceedings in question […].

« 125. For his part, the applicant consistently pointed out that the adoption judgment stood in conflict with the requirements of the domestic law, which prohibited the separation of siblings when ordering adoption […]. This argument was supported by representatives from various public authorities […]. However, at no point in time was that argument examined by the courts. In particular, as the Court has noted above, the applicant did not participate in the adoption proceedings before the first-instance court, and thus was objectively precluded from raising this point in those proceedings […]. Furthermore, in the proceedings under examination, that argument was rejected as irrelevant, without being scrutinised […].

« 126. In such circumstances, even assuming that the applicant’s two claims – for recognition of paternity and for revocation of the adoption order – were intertwined, the Court cannot accept that in the present case the absence under the relevant domestic law of formal grounds for revoking the adoption order was a “sufficient” consideration to justify the courts’ refusal to recognise his paternity in respect of [his daughter] and revoke the adoption order.

« 127. Furthermore, in so far as the courts referred to the period of time – eighteen months – during which [the child] had been in the care of her foster parents, the Court considers that although that was undoubtedly a considerable period of time, particularly for a child of her age, this factor alone could not have ruled out the possibility of reuniting her with her biological family. Indeed, effective respect for family life requires that future relations between parent and child be determined in the light of all the relevant considerations, and not by the mere passage of time […]. Moreover, where the authorities are responsible for a situation of family breakdown, they may not refer to the absence of bonds between the parents and the child when taking decisions regarding the child’s adoption […].

« 128. It is relevant in the above connection that, as the Court has noted in paragraph 115 above, the applicant started taking steps to have his paternity in respect of all his five children established in law and to take them all into his care as soon as he found out about his partner’s death; he also sought revocation of the adoption order as soon as he found out that [his daughter] had been adopted. He thus cannot be said to have waited unreasonably long prior to taking measure with a view to securing his family life with his children, including [his daughter].

« 129. The Court further considers that, whilst a sudden separation from her adoptive family might have had negative effects on the child, it is not convinced that the national authorities explored all possible solutions, bearing in mind that the applicant was [the child]’s biological father, that he was willing and able to care for her, and that his four other children, [the child]’s siblings, were in his care. In particular, in the relevant proceedings, the question of whether it would be viable to reunite [the child] and her natural family under circumstances that would minimise any potential negative effects on the child (for instance, by gradually re-establishing contact between [the child] and her natural family) was never considered.

« 130. In so far as the courts referred to the fact the applicant was not officially employed, whereas [the foster parents] were financially secure, had permanent jobs and proper living conditions, the Court reiterates that it is not enough to show that a child could be placed in a more beneficial environment for his or her upbringing […]. The domestic courts did not elaborate on their argument regarding the applicant’s lack of official employment, therefore it is unclear whether they suggested that he was unable to support his family financially. The Court will not speculate as to whether the applicant’s income was sufficient to ensure an adequate standard of living for his children, as in any event his alleged financial difficulties cannot in themselves be regarded as sufficient grounds for refusing his relevant claims […].

« 131. In the light of the foregoing, the Court concludes that the domestic authorities breached their positive obligation under Article 8 of the Convention, in so far as they failed to carry out an in-depth examination of all the relevant factors and fairly balance the rights of all individuals involved with due regard to the particular circumstances of the present case, which amounted to a failure to respect the applicant’s family life.

« 132. There has accordingly been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention. »

Toujours soucieuse de ne pas mettre en péril le budget des États qui – ne l’oublions pas – la financent, la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme a condamné la Russie à verser 15 000 euros à Sergey pour le préjudice moral qu’il a subi, 72 euros pour ses frais administratifs et 1 850 euros pour la procédure devant la Cour. À ce tarif, les violations des droits de l’homme ne sont pas près de s’arrêter…

Références
Cour européenne des droits de l’homme
Troisième section
5 mai 2020
Affaire Uzbyakov c. Russie (requête nº 71160/13)

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